Abstract. Demand for intelligent surveillance in public transport systems is growing due to the increased threats of terrorist attack, vandalism and litigation. The aim of intelligent surveillance is in-time reaction to information received from various monitoring devices, especially CCTV systems. However, video analytic algorithms can only provide static assertions, whilst in reality, many related events happen in sequence and hence should be modeled sequentially. Moreover, analytic algorithms are error-prone, hence how to correct the sequential analytic results based on new evidence (external information or later sensing discovery) becomes an interesting issue. In this paper, we introduce a high-level sequential observation modeling framework which can support revision and update on new evidence. This framework adapts the situation calculus to deal with uncertainty from analytic results. The output of the framework can serve as a foundation for event composition. We demonstrate the significance and usefulness of our framework with a case study of a bus surveillance project.
Introduction
Recently, more and more attention has been paid by governments and transport operators to protect vehicles and passengers with surveillance cameras, e.g., the Florida School Bus Surveillance project [2] , the First Glasgow Bus Surveillance [22] , Federal Intelligent Transportation System Program in the US [18] , Washington rail corridor surveillance [17] , Airport Corridor Surveillance in the UK [16] , etc. These applications require deployment of large-scale CCTV systems giving rise to unique problems. For example, in a reasonable sized provincial city there may be several hundred buses, each of which has 12-14 cameras, giving a total of several thousand cameras. The large amount of cameras for monitoring passengers/vehicles makes it almost impossible to detect possible incidents manually without delay. For this reason, video analytics and event reasoning are being introduced to CCTV systems in order to ensure in-time reaction.
The aim of video analytics is single-event recognition. Recently, however, developers have realized that it is necessary to manage the events generated by video analysis software. For instance, to prevent anti-social behaviors on public transport systems, one has to make a decision based on a sequence of detected events. Ideally, this would be straightforward if the recognized events are correct and certain. Unfortunately, in reality, imperfection and mistakes frequently occur in practical applications. For example, in the case of a person entering the bus doorway, the person may be classified as male with a certainty of 85% by the classification analytics, rather than with 100% certainty. Even worse, the analytic algorithm may classify a person as female at one time instant and male at a later time. In addition to inaccurate analytics, a large amount of mistakes are caused by the unreliability of the data sources. For example, in the classification example above, the camera may have been tampered with, illumination could be poor, or the classifier training set may be unrepresentative. Any, or all of these, can result in imperfection and errors.
In this paper, we introduce a sequential observation modeling framework which is able to deal with uncertainty, and can support revision and update when new evidence is received, thereby removing the influence of past errors. This framework, which operates at a higher level than analytic algorithms, deploys a situation calculus foundation with the ability to deal with uncertainty in analytic results. It is also able to handle belief revision and update properly. We demonstrate the significance and usefulness of our framework with a case study of a bus surveillance project [12, 7, 10, 15] . Our approach provides a sound framework for surveillance applications, such as CCTV for buses, airports, etc. The output of the framework, i.e., primitive events, can be used as a starting point of event composition.
Usually in situation calculus, there are sensing and non-sensing actions, or epistemic and ontic actions [4] . A sensing/epistemic action senses a property of the domain and does not change the environment. A non-sensing/ontic action is an action done by the agent which changes the environment. A major difference between real-world situations, such as those encountered in surveillance applications, and situation calculus approaches is that in the former, even the result of an ontic action, e.g., a passenger changes their position from standing to seated, is observed by cameras and analyzed by video analytic algorithms (and hence sometimes we call the agent of interest an observable). Therefore, situation calculus should be significantly adapted to make it suitable for intelligent surveillance purposes.
In intelligent surveillance applications the results of both epistemic and ontic actions are provided by video analytics, therefore, we must differentiate between both kinds of actions, since they respond differently upon new evidence being obtained. The properties sensed by epistemic actions are generally invariable, e.g., the gender of a person, etc., whilst properties related to ontic actions are those that can be changed at will, e.g., the position of a person, etc. We also allow external information to be handled in this framework. External information, when received and used, can be seen as a kind of epistemic or ontic action, according to the information properties. For instance, if a piece of information tells us a person is a male, then it can be seen as an epistemic action; if it tells us a person is standing, it can be seen as an ontic action. In addition, a property related to an epistemic action will be called an epistemic or an invariable property, and similarly, a property related to an ontic action is called an ontic or a variable property. In summary, if a property indicates an intrinsic character of an observable of interest, and hence is invariable, then it is an epistemic property. But we also need to point out that this property could be mis-classified or even intentionally disguised, which seemingly makes it variable. For example, although a person is a male, he could be wrongly classified as a female. He could even disguise himself as a female if he wants to. However, this superficial variability should not cause any confusion. Instead, ontic properties are usually external properties between an observable of interest and the environment, and hence are variable, e.g., a passenger can move from the drivers cabin area to the saloon area on a bus. This differentiation between epistemic and ontic properties also applies to properties obtained by video analytics. For instance, if the gender of a person is in fact estimated from the captured video, it is still called an epistemic property since gender is an intrinsic character of a person.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the preliminaries on the situation calculus. In Section 3, formal approaches to deal with uncertain observations are presented, including the ways in which to handle epistemic and ontic actions. Section 4 shows how belief revision is adequately handled in our framework. We then provide a case study, which is a simplified bus surveillance scenario, in Section 5. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
Preliminaries
Situation calculus, introduced by John McCarthy [13, 14] , has been applied widely to model and reason about actions and changes in dynamic systems. It was reinterpreted in [19] as basic action theories which are comprised of a set of foundational axioms defining the space of situations, unique-name axioms for actions, action preconditions and effects axioms, and the initial situation axioms [5] . The well known frame problem is solved by a set of special action effects axioms called successor state axioms.
Since actions carried out by agents cause constant changes of the agents' beliefs, developing strategies of managing belief changes triggered by actions is an important issue. The problem of iterated belief change within the framework of situation calculus has been investigated widely, e.g., [20, 21, 24, 11] . In [24] , a new framework extending previous approaches was proposed, in which a plausibility value is attached to every situation. This way, the framework is able to deal with nested beliefs, belief introspection, mistaken beliefs, and it can also handle belief revision and update together in a seamless way. The framework in [24] is based on an extension of action theory [19] stemming from situation calculus [13, 14] . Here we introduce the notion of situation calculus from [24] which includes a belief operator [20, 21] .
According to [24] , the situation calculus is a predicate calculus language for representing dynamically changing domains. A situation represents a snapshot of the domain. There is a set of initial situations corresponding to what the agents believe the domain might be initially. The actual initial state of the domain is represented by a distinguished initial situation constant, S 0 , which may or may not be among the set of initial situations believed by an agent. The term do(a, s) denotes the unique situation that results from the agent performing action a in situation s.
Predicates and functions whose values may change from situation to situation (and whose last argument is a situation) are called fluents. For instance, we use the fluent InR1(s) to represent that the agent is in room R1 in situation s. The effects of actions on fluents are defined using successor state axioms [19] , which provide a succinct representation for both effect axioms and frame axioms [13, 14] . For instance, if there are two rooms (R1, R2) and an action Leave takes the agent from the current room to the other room. Then, the successor state axiom for InR1 is [24] :
This axiom says that the agent will be in Room 1 after doing action a in s iff either it is in Room 2 and leaves for Room 1 or is currently in Room 1 and does not leave.
Levesque [6] introduced a predicate, SF(a, s), to describe the result of performing the binary-valued epistemic action a. SF(a, s) holds (returns true) iff the sensor associated with a returns the sensing value 1 in situation s. Each epistemic action senses some property of the domain. The property sensed by an action is associated with the action using a guarded sensed fluent axiom [3] . For example, the following two axioms
can be used to specify that SenseLight senses whether the light is on in the room the agent is currently located.
In this paper, we adopt the following conventions about guarded action theories Σ consisting of: (A) successor state axioms for each fluent, and guarded sensed fluent axioms for each action; (B) unique names axioms for actions, and domain-independent foundational axioms; and (C) initial state axioms which describe the initial state of the domain and the initial beliefs of agents. A domain-dependent fluent means a fluent other than the probability fluent p, and a domain-dependent formula is one that only mentions domain-dependent fluents. However, since this is a paper focusing on applications, we will not introduce the axioms here. Interested readers can refer to [24, 11] . We further assume that there is only one agent acting in a chosen domain, although the framework is capable of accommodating multiple agents.
The Revised Situation Calculus Framework
In this section, we extend the situation calculus to include a probability operator to account for iterated belief changes and deal with uncertainty.
Usually in situation calculus, the result of all actions are accurate. In recent work, e.g., [1, 23, 24, 11] , noisy epistemic actions have been proposed and studied. However, in intelligent surveillance applications, not only can epistemic actions be noisy, but ontic actions can also be subject to noise (recall an epistemic action senses some property of the domain, but leaves the environment unchanged, while an ontic action changes the actual environment). That is, in these applications, the results of ontic actions are also reported by video analytic algorithms, which may (and in fact usually, if not always) present uncertain results. For example, if a passenger takes a seat, then from a normal situation calculus point of view, its status certainly changes from "standing" to "seated".
However, if the scenario is analyzed by an algorithm, due to the imperfection of the algorithm, it can only give 90% degree of certainty that the passenger is seated, leaving the remaining 10% still standing. That is, ontic actions can also bring uncertainty, or noise. In fact, in a few scenarios (e.g., light changes suddenly outside the window), the analytic results could be very inaccurate. It may conclude that with 60% degree of certainty the passenger is seated and 40% degree of certainty the passenger is standing. These cases cannot be handled in classical situation calculus. Hence, we need to adapt the situation calculus to deal with such cases.
For convenience, we denote SA the set of all epistemic actions and hence for each action a, a ∈ SA means that a is an epistemic action while a ∈ SA means that a is a ontic action. Since an ontic action a can bring up more than one possible result (e.g., "seated" or "standing"), the corresponding do(a, s) may also give rise to more than one successive situation. An epistemic action a can also bring up more than one possible result if it is not accurate. Hence, subsequently in this paper, we assume do(a, s) is a set of situations instead of a single situation. Moreover, in this paper, we assume SF(a, s) (different from the definition in [6] where SF(a, s) returns a boolean value) gives the tuple-valued sensing result (x 1 , · · · , x k ) where each x i stands for the probability that the epistemic action returns result X i . For instance, in the above example, SF(a, s) = (0.4, 0.6) means that the passenger is male with probability 0.4 and female with probability 0.6 when a is an epistemic action returning the gender of the passenger. For convenience, we also write SF(X, a, s) to denote the probability that the epistemic action a returns X, e.g., SF(M, a, s) = 0.4, SF(¬M, a, s) = 0.6. Similarly, we write NSF(a, s) (NS is short for Non-Sensing) to present the tuple-valued ontic action result (x 1 , · · · , x t ) where each x i stands for the probability that the ontic action returns result X i . For instance, if a is an ontic action changing the behavior of a passenger, then NSF(a, s) = (0.2, 0.8) means that there is a probability 0.2 such that a passenger is standing and a probability 0.8 such that it is seated (¬S). Similarly, we also denote NSF(X, a, s) the probability that the ontic action a returns X.
In this paper, for simplicity, we assume that all actions, regardless of whether they are epistemic or ontic, can only provide two possible results. In fact, if they could return more than two possible results, no essential changes are needed for the framework, but a more cumbersome description of the scenarios, e.g., SF(a, s) will be a n-tuple value where n > 2 and the number of successive situations will become greater, etc..
In this paper, we use ordinals as time points to indicate the sequence of situations. More precisely, all the initial situations will have a subscript 0, denoted as s i 0 (where i indicates the i-th possible situation), and the successive situation of a situation s n will be s n+1 . Let S n denote the set of all situations with subscript n, i.e., the set of situations in the n-th run. Note that if s and s are both in S n , then we should have SF(a, s) = SF(a, s ) (resp. NSF(a, s) = NSF(a, s )) since the action is taken in the real world, it should return only one result, no matter what we think the real-world situation might be (e.g., s or s ). From this sense, we can write SF n (a) or NSF n (a) to denote the action result for situations in the n-th run. Furthermore, we use s/X to denote a situation that the property corresponding to X in s is changed to X, e.g., for s = M ∧ S, we have s/M = s and s/¬M = ¬M ∧ S.
The belief set of S n is defined as follows. Let φ[s] denote that φ is assessed in s.
For example M (the passenger is a male) is assessed in s
That is, φ is believed in the n-th run if it is more probable than its negation. Since this definition is not closed under deduction, i.e., Bel n (φ) ∧ Bel n (ψ)
Bel n (φ ∧ ψ), we usually only consider probabilities (and hence beliefs) on atoms (e.g., M ale, Stand, etc.), while probabilities (and hence beliefs) of other formulae are computed from probabilities of atoms (with independence assumptions) [9] .
Based on the above notations and definitions, we can define a probability function p for each situation s to measure how possible an agent considers s is. The p functions for initial situations are provided with a normalization condition that the sum of probabilities of all initial situations is 1. This is expressed as follows:
Probabilities of successor situations are defined as follows.
If a is an epistemic action and SF(a, s n ) = (t, 1 − t), or SF(X, a, s n ) = t and SF(¬X, a, s n ) = 1 − t, then in general it induces two successive situations for s n , i.e., s n+1 = s n /X and s n+1 = s n /¬X with probability p(s n )t and p(s n )(1 − t) respectively. Note that if t = 0 or t = 1, it in fact only induces one successive situation (situations with probability 0 will be ignored).
However, it is not always reasonable to simply change the current situation to the successive situations as stated above. In some scenarios, we must keep the probabilities of the beliefs induced by the current situations. For instance, assume that at S k , a passenger is classified as a male with probability 0.8, and at S k+1 , this passenger is classified as a male with probability 0.6, then do we need to change the probability to 0.6? The answer is no. In real-world applications such as intelligent surveillance, we observe that if a video analytic algorithm is used to continuously check the gender of a person based on a video, then the probability of that person being a male will fluctuate. Hence in practice, if at some time point, it is classified as a male with probability 0.9, and later with probability 0.85, we can just keep the probability 0.9. A more persuasive scenario is that at some time point we have external information (e.g., an analyst views the person on a monitor) which indicates that the passenger is 100% a male, but later the algorithm still classifies it as a male with probability 0.85, then it is obvious that we do not need to change the probability from 1 to 0.85.
An exception to the above statement, is that the change of probability leads to a change of beliefs. For example, if at S k , a passenger is classified as male with probability 0.8 (hence Bel k (M ) holds), but at S k+1 , it is classified as female with probability 0.75 (hence Bel k+1 (¬M ) holds), then this major change should not be ignored. It may indicate that an interesting event has happened. In real systems, such belief changes with respect to an invariable property, may, by themselves, justify alerting an analyst.
In short, the probabilities of the current belief are only changed when the sensing result overwhelms the current belief. Here by overwhelm we mean either the belief induced by the sensing result is the same as the current belief but with a greater probability or the belief becomes different.
More precisely, let a be an epistemic action and SF(a, s n ) = (t, 1 − t). Without loss of generality, we assume that t > 0.5 1 and hence Bel n+1 (X) holds. For each situation s n ∈ S n , it induces two successive situations, i.e., s n+1 = s n /X and s n+1 = s n /¬X. The probabilities of these two situations are defined as follows:
-if Bel n (¬X) holds, then s n+1 = s n /X and s n+1 = s n /¬X are assigned with probability p(s n )t and p(s n )(1 − t) respectively, -if Bel n (X) holds, then s n+1 = s n /X and s n+1 = s n /¬X are assigned with probability p(s n )max(p n (X), t) and p(s n )(1 − max(p n (X), t)) respectively.
For this we have the following result which shows that the assignment of probabilities satisfy the statements we argued before.
Proposition 1 For any epistemic property X and n > 0, if both Bel n (X) and
There might be some equivalent situations in S n+1 (in terms of all fluents). For convenience, they can be merged together. After some seconds, the camera does a second detection from which the video analytic algorithm asserts that the passenger is male with probability 0.9 and female with probability 0.1. In Fig. 1 , Sensing Gender is abbreviated as SG. Hence each situation induces two successive situations (in Fig. 1, 0 Fig. 1 . It seems that we can let each initial situation in Fig. 1 only induce one successive situation and simply change the probabilities of the successive situations to 0.9 and 0.1, respectively. The reason why we do not follow this way is that the latter approach is not applicable on some occasions. For instance, if there is only one initial situation S 1 0 , then from the second detection, probability 0.1 should be assigned to a successive situation that the passenger is a female but no initial situations can induce such a successive situation.
Example 2 Assume that a video analyzer detects a passenger on board but it does not know whether the passenger is male or female. So it considers two possible situations S

Fig. 1. Situations after Sensing the Gender of a Passenger
If a is an ontic action and NSF(a, s) = (t, 1 − t), then for each situation s n ∈ S n , it induces two successive situations s n+1 = s n /X and s n+1 = s n /Y with probability p(s n )t and p(s n )(1 − t) respectively. Similarly, if there are equivalent induced situations, then we can merge them.
We have the following result.
Proposition 2 For any ontic property X and n > 0, p n+1 (X) = NSF(X, a, s n ). Fig. 1 except that the action is an ontic action) .
After some seconds, the camera does a second detection from which the video analytic algorithm asserts that the passenger takes a seat with probability 0.9 and it is standing with probability 0.1. In Fig. 2 , Sensing Position is abbreviated as SP. Using the above method, finally we get two situations S For any epistemic or ontic actions, the revised probabilities always sum up to 1. 
Belief Revision
Belief revision studies how an agent's beliefs can be changed based on some new information if the new information must be believed. Any property of interest (no matter epistemic properties or ontic properties) could be revised when obtaining certain new information on that property of the observable. Studying belief revision in situation calculus is a natural course for managing an agent's beliefs. In the following, we assume that for each formula φ to be revised, there is a corresponding action that obtains information on that property. Definition 2 (Uniform formula, adapted from [24, 11] ) A formula is uniform if it contains no unbound variables. Note that here the meaning of revision is in fact extended to updating as it also handles changes of ontic properties as ontic actions changes the environment 2 . Now by abuse of notation, we use Bel(φ, s) to denote Bel n (φ) where s is a situation in the n-th run. This theorem proves that revision (as well as updating) in our framework is handled adequately. That is, if new information indicates that φ holds, then the agent will believe that φ holds after performing A. Conversely, if new information shows that φ does not hold, then the agent will believe ¬φ after performing A. This theorem is also consistent with the framework in [20, 21, 24, 11] .
Theorem 2 Let A be a revision action for domain-dependent, uniform formula φ w.r.t. Σ, then the following sentence is satisfiable:
This theorem shows that even if the agent believes ¬φ in S 0 , it will believe φ after performing A when action A provides that φ is true, and still maintains consistent beliefs (¬Bel(F ALSE, do(A, S 0 ))).
Example
The advantage of the methods proposed in this paper is that it can tolerate the existence of errors and correct errors, hence keeps a well established track of video analytics. Error correction can be done by either internal inspections or external inferences. In this section, we use a surveillance example to illustrate this advantage.
Example 4 Now we are going to model a simplified scenario that a passenger boards a bus. We use Fig. 3 SP and SG, we also allow external instructions as external actions into the system, e.g., P (M ) = 1 (resp. P (F ) = 1) in Fig. 3 which means that the external instructions suggesting the passenger is definitely a male (resp. a female). Now we give the explanations of the process depicted by Figure 3 . The two initial situations are: Fig. 3 . Now the monitor in the control room provides a piece of information that this passenger is definitely a male (p(M ) = 1 in Fig. 3 Fig. 3 . Finally, the passenger accidentally removes some of her disguise and the video analytics tell us that it is a female with probability 0.65 and a male with probability 0.35. Then we obtain four successive situations S 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a framework to deal with uncertain observations. This framework is based on a revised version of situation calculus. It allows external instructions as well as internal actions. It is able to tackle with uncertain epistemic actions and uncertain ontic actions. Early errors can be corrected in this framework by revision and updating.
In the literature, probabilistic methods (e.g. dynamic bayesian networks, [26] , etc.) and other AI techniques (e.g. Bilattice reasoning, [25] , etc.) have been applied in computer vision/video surveillance. Comparing to these approaches, our framework considers and easily handles external information. In addition, the ability of belief revision and updating makes it easy to correct past mistakes.
For future work, we are implementing this framework as a part of an on-going intelligent surveillance project (CSIT) to enhance the power of event reasoning, especially for error correction. The full implementation includes a thorough set of ontic actions, epistemic actions for a set of properties of interest. It also can be naturally extended to allow for multiple agents (passengers). In addition, the situations can serve as a foundation for event inference proposed in [12] . Another interesting issue is to study the properties that the framework satisfy.
